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Lavi/ and Social Conflict
I.
Social conflicts can be solv/ed by help of various means: by different 
forms of force, by means of compromises or via the mediation of a third 
party. Today, professional ("learned") jurists - lau/yers or judges - 
are frequently consulted on such matters, whereupon they then try to 
solve social conflicts through recourse to the "law". I shall speak here 
about the different functions which in this context are incumbent on 
the laws produced by act of legislation and thus about the different 
tasks with which the members of our legal organizations are confronted 
in their different " locations" and about the differences in working 
methods and working means which result therefrom. To begin, I should 
like to briefly outline the prepositions from which I shall proc eed:
1) I am speaking to you as an"academic" jurist who by profession is. r~
engaged in deciding conflicts of law between fellow-citizens, and who 
personally is concerned, in particular, with preparing such decisions. 
These decisions always refer to disputes in which I am not personally 
involved. I am consulted because it is expected that I, as a learned 
jurist have access to the findings and means of a science which can 
determine what is "right". So, I proceed on the assumtion that juris­
prudence is a science of "right social decisions", meaning that it is 
an empirical science.
2) This leads us to the question as to what is the "object" of this 
science and from where do the means come which enable one to take 
"right social decisions". Don't think that I am now going to tell you 
what "law" is or what are the sources of law. You have all got to know 
very varied definitions and descriptions of the law which originate 
from different philosophical, sociological, and other ideologies. In
my opinion it is easy to prove that a lawyer cannot, in his professional 
activities, rely on any such definitions or descriptions. The general 
binding force of juridic decisions omits to justify them with reference 
to one of the different philosophies or to the opinion of a scientific 
school. Kant1s statement that lawyers are still looking for a definition




























































































proceed from the fact that there is nothing on which a lawyer my safely 
rely. "We may at least rely on our experience that nothing may be relied 
on. And that's the point from which we must proceed in practice." To 
put this in a more positive light: I proceed from the assumption that 
there is a field of .jurisprudential questioning and cognition: because 
philosophy (or the philosophers), sociology (or the sociologists) etc. 
do not answer the questions as to what is "law" in a manner that decisions 
could be based thereon. And for this reason there is a need for a 
specific (and autonomous) science of law.
3) However, if we proceed from an "autonomy" of jurisprudence in this 
way, there remains from a methodical point of view, only the possibility 
to suppose that there really are such things as "law" and "right social 
decisions". And hence among this law all that needs to be reckoned which 
pretends to be just and right - namely all that which our legal organiza­
tions practise and administrate as "law". Now, one can and even must 
investigate how far and for what reason all this appears to be "right" 
and adequate. What I am now going to tell you results from an analysis 
of the juridical means accepted and employed today.
II.
1) The conceptual-technical means which lawyers refer to in their 
activities may be summarized in three groups: "laws", "decisions" 
(precedents), and "dogmatic theories". I shall confine myself here to 
stating the results obtained from an analysis of the "statute law" as 
a juridical means. Today, as you will see, this tool serves several 
purposes. Yet prior to outlining the various functions of the statute 
law I should like to briefly state the reasons which appear to us as 
being meaningful (right, adequate) to refer to "laws" (rules or legal 
rules) when deciding social conflicts. In this context, keywords such 
as "will of the people" and "democratic legitimation" are those which 
immediately come to mind , or there are other expressions like "self- 
determination or participation of the citizens", and above all "political 
shaping". Yet these are "later" reasons which are not yet at issue. 
Because to make such arguments understandable it is important to know 
what "laws" or, more generally what kind of "rules" are referred to, 
whether "statute laws" or private records such as e.g. the "Sachsen- 
spiegel" of Eike von Repkow . This record was handled as a code of law 




























































































e.g. the "scientific" codification of the international commercial law 
etc. First in my lecture I shall deal with the general normative or legal 
character of the law which is no longer theoretically queried, though - 
in practice - this fact is often not taken into account. We all proceed 
on the assumtion that justice (legal adequacy or rightness) is "normative- 
ly" determined and hence follow a certain understanding of the general 
legal idea according to which equal things are to be treated equal or - 
more precisely - essentially equal things are to be treated equal and 
essentially unequal things need to be treated differently. This makes 
the difference of our and all other European legal systems and of legal 
systems influenced by Europe from other legal cultures. Such the older 
oriental or Chinese legal cultures were based on kadi-justice for which 
among others, the judgement of Salomon is an excellent exemple - meaning 
an example for a just yet non-reproducible judgement. Kadi-justice offers 
justice in consideration of all circumstances - such as we try to practise 
on our children. Normative justice wears an eye patch, it considers only 
the "circumstances relevant in law".
2) We have hence adopted the tradition of the Greek philosophy and 
the Jewish theology and have decided for equal treatment of,so to speak, 
abstract persons and not - as the kadi-justice which has no eye patch and 
considers the heart - for equal treatment of personalities. And from this 
decision results a line of consequences for our juridical "methods" 
and "means" which I can only roughly outline here. So, among others, the 
obligation to form a system or at least the obligation to use "systematic 
notions" is based on this decision: because of natural inequality, equality 
always needs^e established by means of "basic or preliminary decisions" 
through an act of abstraction. Hence equal treatment presupposes at all 
times a series of preliminary decisions, whereby a great number of such 
preliminary decisions are always at hand.
In this context, it is of particular importance that the decision in 
favour of equal treatment implies, in the long run, to take into legal 
considerations the effects of the legal organization, since factual equal 
treatment is obtained with the help of organizations only. And when law 
shall be realized in the form of equal treatment and shall be'effective 
as such, judges must take into consideration how other judges have decided 
and still decide in similar cases. Deviating decisions which other judges 
will probably not follow, are "wrong" (unjust) because they do not even 




























































































only measure for justice, it is nevertheless for us an indispensable 
prerequisite for tight (just) decisions. From our decision in favour of 
the principle of equal treatment there results likewise, the organized 
separation of issues of law and fact, just like the trend towards justi­
fication of decisions which I am unable to deal with in more detail here. 
However, it is definitely clear that "normative justice" which neglects 
natural inequalities, may only be realized after having stated what 
essentially equal facts.
3) In the course of juristic discussions these statements have gradually 
been generally accepted in our cultural complex. They do, however, not 
yet point tor the phenomena of state-legislation which today largely 
determines our legal life. They suggest in fact authoritative records 
of the existing legal rules such as were offered,for example, by the 
"Land- und Stadtrechtsreformationen" - German codes of the early modern 
times, i.e., records from which we know that partly contained innovations. 
"Normative justice" too, is designed for being modified. It follows 
progress or, better, the change of knowledge. However, history of the 
law underlines quite clearly that the idea of law being generated or
r
realized with the help of volitive decisions, is comparatively new. And 
in my opinion, we are not yet quite clear about what this new "source" 
of law, meaning state-legislation, has in common with the tratidional 
ideas of law and justice.
This has practical consequences: for example, apart from such branches 
where the rules of the legislator prevail, there are branches of law where 
decisions are largely determined through precedents. English law is a 
good example where common law and statutes exist side by side. And we 
represent these factual situations partly in theories which (similarly 
to the English law) differentiate stritly between the application of 
legal rules and "free" (law-producing) decisions and hence finally 
abandon the unity of law and the principle of equal treatment. Or we 
refer to theories which, as an intrinsic source of law, Constitute a 
system of "values" which stands behind laws and decisions, and for the 
proof of which (finally subjektive) "confessions" and similar need be 
refered to, whereby, however, the general character of law gets lost.
For the rest, all these "theories" and representations consider the 
products of state-legislation as an uniform phenomenon. Depending on the 
various theories, the judges are bound either to a"strict" application 
of the law (meaning all laws) or they are bound only "within certains 




























































































numerous cases the legal rules may comparatively easily be bypassed 
whereas in other cases there is a "strict" commitment to the laws 
even where they appear to be wrong or absurd. Hence, a realistic theory 
of statute law or of state-legislation must apparently consider this fact 
from the very beginning as a differentiated phenomenon. It must reveal 
why in one instance the laws may be bypassed and why they are strictly 
to be observed in another. We shall hence investigate in the following 
why it appears to be advisable (adequate, right) to refer to the statute 
law when deciding social conflicts; or, to put it another way, why these 
laws appear as a means to obtain "right" (just) decisions.
III.
1) It is striking that in many cases statue laws are still today 
considered as being an adequate means to establish "right" (just) social 
decisions because they warrant equal treatment. In this context, I should 
like to remind you of the above mentioned "Land- und Stadtrechtsreforma- 
tionen" and of other "authoritative records". Especially in those cases 
where differing "theories" are represented and defended, and where there­
fore "right" decisions are controversial, factual equal treatment may 
obviously be better ensured when the courts are offered a clear and 
generally accessille basis for their decisions, up to settlement of the 
conflict, that is to say up to the general propagation of the "right 
finding". In case of doubt, i.e. as long as the dispute about the right 
decision continues, the judges will observe, and be obliged to observe, 
these guidelines when they are interested in ensuring equal treatment.
This phenomenon may be designated as the "normative function" of the 
laws. And this function leads to a "dogmatic" committment" to the laws 
meaning that the judges are bound to applicate such a law unless it 
turns out to be "wrong": as "contradictory vis-à-vis the legal cognition' 
which is oriented towards equal treatment. So if we state e.g. that 
the new amendment to the code of civil procedure, which tries to 
accelerate procedures, possibly hinders the "poor party" from defending 
against an action (because an attorney-at-law required as per para. 276,
II of the code of civil procedure, is not always assigned within two weeksC 
the respective rule will be corrected with reference to art. 3 of our 
Fundamental Law (GG) in the course of "interpretation conforming with 
the constitution". Such examples might be continued at discretion, and 
not only in German decision-making. It is certain that (but for a few 




























































































also considered and understood as a means to warrant equal treatment 
and that we correct "errors" which the legislator makes in this respect.
2) Yet (today) when we speak of laws and their binding force, this is 
mostly with another function of the law in mind, meaning a function which 
at the first glance is in contradiction to that outlined above and which 
the law has (for this reason ?) adopted only at a later date. New statutes 
are often considered as a means of amending the law - and hence a means 
which enables us to treat the persons concerned differently than up to 
now, namely unequally. The fact, however, that in future all decisions 
need be taken in accordance with the new law, underlines that this is 
only an apparent contradiction. For the new legal rule is referred to 
as a means of amending existing law so as to adjust it to the progress 
(or change) occurring in extralegal and metalegal circumstances and 
findings. Hence, an amendment to the law through new statutes aims at 
reaching an "improved equal treatment": that is it aims at reaching an
V
improvement in the law which is possible and hence necessary due to new 
find jigs (because "right" social decisions are at issue), or to "only" 
obtain an amendment of the law which takes changed living conditions into 
account.
Such changes in the living conditions or progresses in knowledge habe, 
indeed, always existed. And as we know from the history of law, the law 
has always taken this fact into account, even in times where the statute 
laws were not yet employed as a means to amend the law or to adjust it 
to new circumstances. However, in former times such "new" findings or new 
conditions led to such an adjustment only when they had become self- 
evident, meaning when they had been generally accepted. If we now have 
decided to entrust state legislation with adjustments, this shows that 
we are convinced that it is better, "more right", and hence "more just" 
to adjust the law to changed circumstances and to the progress of extra- 
legal findings and to thus improve it already at a stage when these 
findings have not yet been generally accepted. Today, this conviction 
is generally accepted: e.g. we do no longer wish to settle the problems 
of nuclear energy until there is general consent as to how to behave 
"correctly" in this respect.
So the statute law has for us besides the "normative function" also a 
function of amendment and improvement. This function leads to a strict 
binding to the legals rules, i.e. to a binding force which even existes 




























































































state e.g. that a law Intending to accelerate procedures does not yield 
the desired effect, we are not allowed to correct this law. The courts 
may and must, in fact, correct the statute laws when they are in contra­
diction to the "legal cognition" meaning when they do not lead to equal 
treatment of essentially equal things. However, if a law is in contra­
diction with extralegal findings "only", it must be applied even in those 
cases where the fault of the law is "evident". It is hence the task of the 
courts to realize recognized and accepted findings of what is essentially 
equal. The courts need to direct their efforts to factually enforcing 
the already reached degree of equal treatment. On the other hand, the 
legislator is entrusted with improving the principle of equal treatment 
on basis of more recent findings.
In view of this "strict binding" even to unsatisfactory laws, it is today 
often difficult to understand jurisprudence as an empirical science of 
right social decisions. This "strict binding" to the statute law can be 
considered as a "means to improve the law" only when the state legislator 
is attributed a (qualitatively) higher understanding than is expected 
from the individual judge. And the quality of many laws seems to argue 
against it. Hence the law and binding to the law are toclay mostly 
associated with volitive phenomena only. The laws are understood as the 
"will of the people", political legitimation of the legislator is 
referred to, etc. And though nobody contests that the laws are also 
political, ideological phenomena etc.; this characterization is, in my 
view, not sufficient to cover the legal dimension of the laws. The 
legal aspect of the laws will become visible only when asking in how far 
it is in fact adequate or "right", to adjust the law with the help of 
new statutes to the changed situation and progress of knowledge instead 
of with other means such as through committing the judges to the findings 
of "scientific experts".
This question immediate¥y*?oSthe risks which a commitment of the courts 
to - different - experts would entail for the principle of equal treatments 
The judges never habe access to the findings of the science yet only to 
the statements of individual representatives of individual sciences which 
are often in contradiction. However, the search for other possible forms 
of adjustment shows quite clearly that commitment to the findings of the 
science is not all a means to promise "right s°ciel decisions", because 
the science exists only as a continuity of discussions which comprises 
numerous controversial findings. So, when today we think it correct to 



























































































a stage where we have not yet entailed definite and generally accepted 
findings, there is a need for a means which enables such clear and 
definite findings. And in our view, our procedure of legislation is 
such a "means" to establish "right findings": Because it includes steps 
and measures which seem to be suited to compensate the "uncertainty"
(or openess) of the general finding process. If the law is to be 
adjusted to the chaged situation and progress in knowledge at a stage 
where "safe" findings are not yet available, it seems to be adequate 
(and right) to rely, in doing so, on those findings which are accepted 
by the majority: not because the majority or the consent renders 
"rightness" more probable or warrants it, but because such a procedure 
entails less unjustice. If errors or faults turn out at a later date, 
less people can plead that in their view these decisions have always 
been wrong: volenti non fit iniuria. Hence, the judges are bound to
*the state law also in those cases wherethese are "wrong" according to 
their own extralegal findings, because relying on own findings (i.e. 
extralegal findings which they consider correct) does not ensure "legal" 
decisions - decisions, which are generally right.
. r -
Hence, the procedure of legislation appears as an adequate (right) means 
to adjust the law to the progress of knowledge etc. because it combines 
two very different aspects - and only when these aspects are permanently 
combined: can it ensure on the one hand consideration of the new findings 
and changed situations through preliminary work realized by administration, 
through hearings, experts committees, etc. and warrant on the other hand 
- through the participation of politicians - that a consent is reached 
which in turn reduces the number of "unjust decisions". And as the new 
laws regulate issues and problems with which but a few citizens have so 
far been concerned, the politicians often have to produce a consent.
Hence, our legislation procedure takes place in a number of well-matched 
steps and ensures thus the contribution on the part of different "experts", 
meaning from representatives of interests, jurists, administration experts, 
and politicians. Thus all these experts contribute to the later law and 
perform in this way most varied efforts which must be accomplished to 
make the law become a suited (and appropiate, right) means to take right 
social decisions.
Hence, we may and even must, proceed from the statement that (seen from 
the side of the lay) also the politicians have their task in the process 
of legal cognition meaning the task to reach or to produce a consent about




























































































which means is today the right one, because this consent leads to less 
■"injustice". On the other hand, we may and must realize that the law, 
as the product of this legislation procedure, is not (alone) the result 
of this activity performed by the politicians (though they may "vote" 
for the law - this will be dealt with later). The statute law is a 
legal law namely: a means to obtain right social decisions., only because 
it is the product of the activities of politicians and "scientists" or 
other "experts". In this context, I should like to underline that we 
hav/e always taken this fact into account: so it has always been stressed 
that the records of parliament debates only have an unimportant part 
for the court as well as for argumentation of jurists who aim to inter­
pret the law, and - in doing so - have reference to so called "materials". 
In this context, the professionally and materially more comprehensive 
preliminary work of experts is of higher practical importance so that 
e.g. the motives for the 1st draft of the BGB which as such has never 
become a law, have gained a greater importance than the "Reichstags- 
protokolle" to the BGB. If laws were primarily "political decisions"
(i.e. the products of the work of politicians), the above mentioned 
parliament records would have to constitute the decisive "materials".
So, it may be recorded that the statute law appears as the "right" (and 
adequate) means of adjusting the respective law to a progress and change 
in findings and situations because it considers on the one hand the 
findings of science (of the experts) and because it compensates on the 
other hand the openess of the findings through the (political) statement 
and production of consent. Prom this point of view the statute law is 
a means of cognition of law, and not a political means of shaping. To 
avoid misunderstandings, I should like to stress that this refers only 
to the legal or jurisprudential perspective of the law. Sociologically 
(i.e. analyzed from a sociological point of view and with the help 
of conceptual-technical means of sociology etc.) the laws appear as 
something totally different: as a means of power etc. - and with 
good reason.
From a general point of view, however, the sociologico-political 
analysis of "legislation" may be attributed a higher cognitive value.
The members of the legislative organs will probably feel themselves 
to be "politicians" (and this often means : organizers) rather than 
collaborators in legal cognition. A ccordingly, the parliament records 
have practically less importance for the interpretation of the law 




























































































their debates are oriented primarily (and justly) to their own - 
political - task which consist in reaching a consent. And when 
accomplishing this task, they will use other conceptual-technical 
aids than are required in the framework of legal argumentations. For 
example they use terms and notions which can be understood by everyone 
(and which point for example, to the liberal and social character of a 
law), because a general consent may only be reached in this way.
However, it is worth-while mentioning that the activities of politicians 
are of central importance to legal cognition as well and that they 
contribute something to legal cognition which a jurist cannot do by 
himself. In our view, legal cognition today is the task of a system 
which is based on division of labour.
> i
3) There is still another function of our current statute law which 
has so far not been dealt with. In the framework of our law the famous 
judgements of the "Reichsgericht" regarding theft of electric power, 
constitute a first reference to this function. A first judgement in 
1896 refused to punish "power thieves" because at that time only the 
removal of "things" was prosecuted. In our context, it is of interest 
that all arguments which were in favour of punishment Tor coal thieves, 
were likewise applicable to theft of electric power. In accordance 
with the principle of equal treatment, this would have lead to both 
coal and electric power thieves being equally punished or remaining 
unpunished. According to the principle "nulla poena sine lege" which 
characterizes our criminal law, the courts were bound to treat both 
forms of theft differently, and this was only because the legislator 
had decided so. In other words: The "nulla poena principle" excluded, 
and still excludes, recourse to the principle of equal treatment for 
the application of the criminal law (unlike for the former mentioned 
cases). It requires decisions without consideration of the legal findings 
and this means decisions which lead to a certain "unequal treatment".
This kind of decision exists, however, not only in the criminal law.
The problem coming up in this context may perhaps be best illustrated 
with the help of an example which was discussed in 1971 on occasion of 
the International Congress of the Association on Philosophy of Law and 
Social Science in Brussels. At that time, the jurists from all countries 
agreed in that a law which prohibits the taking along of dogs in tram­
ways likewise applies to cats and small bears, whereas a law which 




























































































and bears. So, let's think over why the wording of a law may be corrected 
"in the first case by recourse to the principle of equal treatment (which 
means to legal findings) whereas in the second case the same is excluded-
a) In the beginning, one will be disposed to explain and to "justify" 
these differences in the decisions by pointing to the fact that tax laws 
and criminal lawy interfere with the legal sphere of the individual 
citizens and need hence be interpreted in a strict sense whereas the 
prohibition to take animals in tramways does not interfere with special 
rights of citizens. In earlier - and differently structured - legal 
systems, this explanation would have been sufficient. So e.g. in the 
early modern times, police regulations which restricted "luxury" and 
often also criminal laws were not considered as rules which restricted 
the citizens' rights because nobody could have a right to - sinful - 
luxury or to "bad" acts. On the other hand, tax laws required "naturally* 
the consent of the Diet, etc. Today we proceed, however, from the 
assumtion that all legal rules potentially interfere with the rights
of the citizens, meaning in those cases where they are not supported by 
sufficient legitimation. And with this in mind, the prohibition to taker~
animals in tramways just like the levy of "taxes" is to bee seen as 
a "restriction" of the general freedom of action through the state, and 
it is still unclear why this restriction may on the one hand be extended 
by means of legal findings and why it is impossible in another case.
b) The main point of this question will perhaps become clearer when 
comparing our present legal organization with former ones. And in this 
context it may be of help to compare the present representation of 
separation of powers with the description which Montesquieu gave in
his "L'Esprit de Loi". Montesquieu too, distinguished between legislative^, 
executive, and judicial powers. However, in his view judicial power is 
merely a special branche of the executive power, because it is the 
executiv power with a view to matters which depend on the civil law.
Due to this power, the sovereign (or the state) punishes the criminals 
or settles disputes between private persons. And for this reason 
Montesquieu calls it judicial power. Accordingly, the proper executive 
power refers to matters which depend on the law of nations, meaning to 
matters of foreign policy, in particular of war and peace. In the 
framework of this system, the sovereign appears as the "means" to 
attribute new findings to the law. For this reason, the sovereign 
needed to be absulute, i.e. unbound, he was sovereign "by the grace of 




























































































interfere in their rights. The levy of taxes needed the consent of the 
Diet, and they u/ere then collected just like other "private" debts. 
Criminal and commercial lau/s formulated merely the "good order" without 
being "interferences".
This (legal) system which we call "absolutism" or later "moderate abso­
lutism" was finally surpassed by two developments: on the one hand, the 
number of measures considered necessary increased which according to 
the former opinion constituted "interferences" and which needed hence 
the general consent: above all expropriations. This development lead 
to those organizations which we consider today as the executive power 
in its true-sense: interior administration. On the other hand at the 
same time, it was generally recognized that all rules or laws restrict 
the rigths of the citizens (and this possibly unjustly), i.e. also 
commercial laws, criminal laws ets. Due to the general development r 
of cognition and philosophy the law was no longer considered as the 
"existing order" but as a "means" to limit the spaces of freedom; 
because - after the Cartesian revolution of thinking people no longer 
tried to substantiate cognition (and legal findings as well) on basis. r
of the (present) objects alone, but on basis of the subject. So, the 
law necessarily presupposed "freedom of will" because "rules" can only 
be important for people who have freedom of will.
This led to the organization which we call "democratic" and which is 
characterized by the idea of the sovereignty of the people. This is 
because the sovereign (or another individual) could be understood as the 
"right" means to improve the law as long as his "errors" (which cannot 
be avoided in case of problematic innovations) were considered by the 
people as a consequence of the unfathomable will of God who had instituted 
the "sovereign by the grace of God" as governor of the people. Without 
this understanding, new (and hence possibly "erroneous" or wrong) laws 
can only be accepted when these errors may be attributes to the citizwns 
themselves: volenti non fiat iniuria. For this reason, the legislator, 
and his products, the statutes, had to be used as a means to introduce 
new findings in the law, and not as until war the executive power: 
because by means of the statute law, all state actions can be traced 
back to the mandate of the people; among others, an expression of this 
thought is the modern doctrine of the reservation of the law. This does, 
however, not mean that all amendments and innovations are materially 
produced by the sovereign (the people) or by the legislator (members of 




























































































experts. However, the decisive factor is that "rightness" (legality) 
of findings is now insured by the politicians as well who provide for 
stating or obtaining the consent so as to minimize the number of 
possible injustices - and which keeps their number at a low level as 
long as the citizens (the people) can understand and do understand the 
members of parliament as "their representatives".
c) In this context, it is important to know that we have established 
two basically different forms of social acting and decision making by 
committing every action of the state to the "order of the people" set up 
in law. So, public acting and decision making takes place as an action 
of the government which is based on the "legal order", which means legally 
and in accordance with the rules. Besides there is a space left for
g^0C
private actions which orient on personal preliminary judgements and 
which is hence generally considered as "incidental". The model for ’ 
acting is no longer, as it was before, only the "bonus vir" (the 
faithfull, Christian father) and neither, as in planning systems, only 
the administrator of the goods of the people who acts according to an 
overall plan. We have a rather organized side-by-side existence of 
different "models" of acting and deciding: the "servant of the people" 
may act in accordance with his findings. He has a "discretionary power" 
and does not need to obey "blindly". However, he must (or is expected 
to) act, other than the citizen, legally (in accordance with the rules) 
and must not decide once this way and then another way. Such a side- 
by side existence of different forms of action ohiously can only lead 
to unity when it is organized on a division of labour basis. We were 
bound to set up and have in fact established different areas of 
responsibility with the help of a series of competence regulations and 
have tried to prevent the different courses of actions from interfering 
with one another. In these areas, the individual officials or citizens 
persorm their own tasks in accordance with their orders or in accordance 
with their personal aims.
As any other division of labour, this organization of a "social division 
of labour" entails numerous conseguences. So the competence or 
organizational rules with the help of which the different areas of 
responsibility have been established, have to be configurated "formally" 
(positivistically). These rules must not and cannot be interpreted 
"directly" (materially, rationally, according to ones own legal findings)- 




























































































material of labour is rather oriented towards "indirect steering" 
(planning). Division of labour is planned (determined) through splitting 
up of competences the interplay of which shall lead to what is right.
The various sub-systems then work according to their own rules whereby 
the activities of the "neighbours" are sometimes considered as interfering 
wrong, unreasonable, etc. The "overall achievement" will then result 
from the interplay of the individual part systems. It is not the 
product of an individual or of an individual office - because this 
would abolish "freedom".
Hence, our system which is based on division of labour is oriented 
towards an "indirect rationality" in different respects. Each range 
of responsibility (every department) is organized so as to act reasonably
by itself, confined to its aims and its area of responsibility. Which*
means that no individual and no individual department is directly respon­
sible for "the society as a whole". Overall responsibility is born 
jointly by all persons responsible. From this results on the one hand 
that in systems based on the division of labour it may always be proved 
that (generally, with a view to the whole) much, which Is considered, 
unreasonable (wrong etc.) takes place. "If I had to decide ...". It is, 
of course, possible to try to minimize such consequences of division of 
labour. Yet such consequences can only be excluded by abolishing the 
division of labour which would, however, result in a deterioration 
with respect to the capacity of the entire system. Hence, systems 
(including legal systems) based on division of labour may be considered 
as being "justified" (appropriate and right) through their total result 
for which no individual alone is fully responsible. The individual sub­
systems act and work in accordance with their own aims and rules, which 
in many cases seems to be "unreasonable" for the individual because 
their efficiency will often only result from the total result of the 
system which,the individual is often unable to "see through". Systems 
based on division of labour including legal systems often demand (too ?) 
much comprehension from the persons involved who must be particulary 
well informed to be able to comprehend legal systems as reasonable.
In many cases, the state law has today the special function of (indirect) 
planning. This planning function or better: constitutional function thus- 
to the normative and improvement functions. It is connected with the 
rules which organize division of legal activities and it leads to a 




























































































findings and hence to (at least temporarily) unequal treatment - as 
illustrated by the examples of electric power and coal thefts. All 
competence rules have (such) a "constitutional character" or "planning 
character" this applies to all laws which delimit state (public) and 
"private" activities, and also to private status rules, regulations of 
legal capacity (status) and similar. The tram driver of our above example 
is hence free to refuse the transport of cats and bears on basis of the 
prohibition of dogs, because he is responsible for the internal organi­
zation of the tramway. He may and must hence refer to the general legal 
finding to ensure equal treatment. The tax official is not free to 
extend the dog tax to cats and bears because he is not competent for 
assessment of the social consequences of such a measure.
IV.
To conclude I should like to add some remarks to individual conclusions 
which may be drawn from the above considerations about functions of the 
law with respect to the actual jurisprudential and legal policy discussion
1) The first conclusion is that politics and political considerations. r
areare without importance for the lawyer (as lawyer), as opposed to 
opinions which are often put forward. The reason for this is that reference 
to "political considerations" would increase the dispute in case of 
"unclear" (controversial) cases and not solve it. The jurists could be 
helped bey "political" considerations and arguments only when pditics 
or political science could promise "more clear" (more difinite, which 
means finally "more simple") findings than the law or the science of law do, 
yet nothing points to this^ The jurist is able to decide issues about 
which policicians are disputing - with good reasons - because the legal 
finding may refer to criteria which are not available to politics 
(political science or sociology) which is the principle of equal treatment 
Legal decisions are meant to realize the degree of equality and justice 
already reached. And therefore the organization available offers legitime 
criterias. Politics, however, are oriented towards "improvement" meaning 
to an equality which is still to be realized. They - and not the lawyers - 
are ableto change the organizations. So politics do not (yet) lead to 
findings (judgements) but only to decisions. Today's appeal to the jurists 
to decide "politically" or at any rate "politics-oriented" means, hence 
no improvement of decisions, may yet lead to the jurist abandoning means 




























































































2) The Distinction between the different functions of the law and the 
considerations dealing with the division of labour of our legal organi­
zation demonstrate moreover in which way "political" decisions and 
findings are decisive for our law. for they do not only pass into legal 
dicisions (judgements) via the "law" the political statements of which 
need then be completed by the own political "valuations" of the judges; 
as you can often hear. Political or other "evaluations" determine 
moreover also the statements of facts which I am going to demonstrate 
in brief on the basis of an example from the constitutional law 
procedure; for the rest, administrative jurisdiction and other procedures' 
supply still further examples.
The Federal Constitutional Court had recently to decide the issue of 
sessional expense allowance of the members of parliament. The result 
was that members of parliament, unlike before, are allowed to receive 
"equal" expense allowances only because they are no longer able, or 
more precisely: they must no longer perform their activities on a "part- 
time basis". Because a "non-uniform remuneration" of members of parliament^ 
as was provided for by former laws, was only "right" (just) as such
. T“  ■
payments could be understood as compensation for the private working 
time which the members of parliament sacrificed for the general public.
In this way, the "value" of the residual working time which differs for 
every case, could be considered as a measure for the importance of this 
"sacrifice" which the individual member of parliament made for the 
general public. From that moment on, however, where members of parliament 
could and should only be occupied by parlamentary and party's activities, 
this measure was no longer applicable. Now, the sessional expense 
allowance is only a state allowance which shall enable the members of 
parliament to do their work for the general public. And with this in 
mind, such allowances need necessarily be uniform ("equal"), because in 
the eyes of the general public all members of parliament are equally 
entitled "representatives of the people". It is now of interest for us 
how the Federal Constitutional Court came to the statement that the 
members of parliament can or shall perform this activity, other than 
formerly, no longer on a part-time basis. Then when we reflect, that 
the particular Court had to decide about the complaint of a member of 
the State Diet of the Saarland, we would like to say, that in this case 
the Court could quite well proceed from the fact that a part-time 
antivity was fully sufficient. When examining why the Federal Constitutional 




























































































parliament (and hence also the member of parliament from the Saar) 
cannot (and shall not) perform their activities on a "part-time-basis", 
you will state this issue had already been "pre-decided" by the statement 
of the competent legislator whose predecisions were binding upon the 
Court in the framework of establishing the issue of fact. For there were 
in the Federation and in all other Federal states legal rules for which 
this was a prerequisite such as regulations of pension etc. So, the 
Federal Constitutional Court had to proceed from the fact that the 
activities of a member of parliament could no longer be performed on 
a part-time basis because it was unable to amend the "facts" established 
by the legislator. And the decision of the political issue as to whether 
the members of parliament shall perform their activities on a full-time 
or part-time basis belongs to the competence of the legislator, and not 
to that of the Federal Constitutional Court. The latter may in fact 
state that a law which prescribes an activity to be done on a part-time 
basis, needs not be observed when the members of parliament are unable 
to fulfill their tasks with which they are entrusted by the law on a 
part-time basis. However, the Court has to examine the framework of 
establishing the issue of fact the "trueness" (seriousness) of legal 
rules. For the rest, it has "only" to decide which conclusions may be 
drwan from one or another "rule" regarding the issue of sessional 
expense allowances. And hence the only thing left was reference to 
equal treatment, because the former justification of different 
remunerations had become inapplicable, meaning for spending their 
(private) working time.
In a similar way constitutional and administrative courts need to accept 
"political" pre-decisions of the politically controlled administration 
when establishing the facts. For if a law allows different possible 
interpretations, the politically controlled administration has to 
decide on one or the other "policy" which will then be covered by the 
law. In the framework of establishing the issue of fact the courts are 
then only able to examine whether administration performs a policy 
which is oriented towards equal treatment or whether it is deciding in 
different ways ("arbitrarily") and hence "contrary to law". They are, 
however, unable to order in the course of interpretation which of the 
policies seeing allowed by law the administration should perform.
3) The distinction between the different functions of the law imposes 
for the rest to precisely think over in every case which method of 




























































































an individual area of responsibility are at issue, such as e.g. disputes 
among citizens or disputes within the differentiated state organizations, 
then "materially right" decisions need be taken. In such a case, the 
jurist can and even must refer to the legal findings. If, however, 
delimitation of the different areas of responsibility is at issue, 
only "formal" decisions can be taken which refer to indirect rationality. 
So the federal Social Court has e.g. justly decided (and with the 
approval of the Federal Constitutional Court) that honorary judges need 
be consultet in case of a decision about a complaint of non-admission in 
the same way as they are consulted in case of decisions about revisions. 
As to this issue, the court could refer to the "legal-finding" and 
could order equal treatment of the materially equal cases "revision" and 
"complaint of non-admission" because here the question of a right 
"intrastate organization" was at issue. Contrary to this decision, the 
first Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court decided justly in the 
case of a constitutional complaint against the amendment of the 
procedure on review, that the question as to when the Federal Court 
may refuse a revision, needs be "formally" (and without consideration of 
the legal finding) regulated because in this case delimination of the 
rights of the citizens as against the state organizations are at issue, 
meaning competences which determine the special kind of our social 
system based on division of labour.
V.
To conclude, I should like to state that in my view there are today 
increasing signs which cause doubt as to whether we are able to continue 
to maintain this "legal system based on division of labour" which refers 
to normative justice and hence to equal treatment. The public reaction 
to the Majdanek procedure and the Holocaust TV series demonstrated in 
my view particularly clearly that there is an increasing urge for a 
kadi-judge who decides in consideration of all circumstances which means 
a want for a justice which has no longer an eye patch. Decisions are 
asked and taken which are in opposition to the generally accepted 
principles and requirements of legal and criminal policy the "rightness" 
(justice) of which may only be understood with a view to the special 
circumstances. This corresponds thatorientation towards "persons" gains 
an increase in importance. Here, it es worthwhile pointing (e.g.) 
to the position of Ted Kennedy in American political life which may 




























































































orientation towards "persons" and not towards (normative) factual issues 
promises evidently for many people a greater transparency of the world 
which is then arranged and understandable through human relations 
(" relations of loyality"). Factually, here an orientation towards 
"images" is at issue which the TV propagates of such persons, meaning 
towards images which are "made" by publicity agencies. So one has to 
realize that such an orientation towards an "image" leads to another 
justice than orientation towards the "word" (meaning rules). Yet this is 
a large field which may perhaps be dealt with in the discussion in more 
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